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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH# J 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890583-CA 
v. i 
RICKY PALMER, i Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of retail theft, a 
third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-602(1) and 76-
6-412(l)(b)(i) (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial 
court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress an x-ray 
taken of him without his consent and without a warrant pursuant 
to an order of the police, and a diamond ring revealed by the x-
ray and subsequently seized by the police after the ring was 
naturally passed from defendant's body in a bowel movement. 
The standard of review for defendant's challenge to the 
lower court's suppression ruling is that set forth in State v. 
Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, P.2d 
(Utah 1989): 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. 
The trial judge is in the best position to 
assess the credibility and accuracy of the 
witnesses' divergent testimonies. However, 
in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a 
"correction of error" standard. 
771 P.2d at 327 (citations omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ricky Palmer, was charged with retail theft, 
a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. S§ 76-6-602 and 76-6-
412(l)(b)(i) (1990) (R. 6-7). 
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress, defendant entered and the court accepted a conditional 
guilty plea to the charge pursuant to State v. Sery# 758 P.2d 
935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (R. 31-37; T. 81-83). Under Sery, 
defendant preserved the suppression issue for appellate review. 
The court sentenced defendant to a term of zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison, fined him $2,500, and ordered him 
to pay restitution in an amount to be determined by the Board of 
Pardons (R. 38). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the most part, the statement of facts in 
defendant's brief on appeal is an accurate summary of the 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing in the trial court. 
However, several clarifications are necessary. 
First, defendant's statement of facts suggests that he 
was not under arrest until after the x-ray had been taken and 
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developed. Br. of Appellant at, b To the contrary, Sgt. Mayo of 
the Salt Lake City Police Department, who directed the 
investigation, made clear that defendant had been advised that he 
was under arrest at the store, well before the x-ray examination 
(T. 30-31) And, the trial court so found (T. 76). 
Second, Sqt Mfty«i testified that he based his decision 
to obtain an x-ray of defendant on the following factors: (1) 
once at Sears, he had learned that there had been a theft of a 
diamond ring from the jeweliy counter and that defendant was the 
prime suspect based on information from the store clerk and 
security guards; (2) ? thorough search of the parking lot by the 
police and securit K ^oduced the rii lg; (3) a strip 
search of defendant had likewise not produced the ring; (4) "if, 
1n fact, the ring had been discarded in the parking lot, every 
minute that went by would increase the likelihood tillat someone 
would locate the ring and it would be lost" (T. 27-28). With 
respect to the exigencies present, Sgt. Mayo stated: 
Because of the value of the ring, if it was 
not inside Mr. Palmer, then I was going to 
bring out some more officers and we were 
going to do a more detailed search of the 
parking lot. But it was getting late, and as 
I say, the only place it could have been once 
in the parking lot, was under some of the 
cars. Because we did a fairly detailed 
search, and the cars were leaving, as soon as 
the customers were finished shopping at 
Sears, we were going to be able to do a more 
detailed search. It was getting late. It 
was getting dark and cars were leaving[.] I 
felt we were under some type of time 
constraint. So, I wanted them to advise me 
as soon as possible of the result of the x-
ray. 
t T 2 y ) . 
Finally, contrary to defendant's contention that Sgt. 
Mayo Hacknowledged that it would take less than two hours to 
obtain a warrant by telephone," Br. of Appellant at 4-5, Mayo's 
testimony is most fairly interpreted as indicating that a warrant 
could be obtained in no less than two hours (T. 40-41). Indeed, 
the trial court specifically found that "it would have taken a 
minimum of two hours to obtain a search warrant" (T. 77). 
The trial court made detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law from the bench (T. 74-81), which are attached 
as an addendum to this brief. The trial court's factual 
findings, which defendant does not challenge, form the basis for 
this Court's review of the lower court's legal conclusions, which 
are challenged by defendant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial correctly concluded that the police-ordered 
x-ray of defendant, which was obtained without his consent or a 
warrant, did not constitute a fourth amendment violation. That 
warrantless search was consistent with the principles set forth 
in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
Alternatively, the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress may be affirmed on the basis of Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), which enunciated the "inevitable 
discovery" doctrine. 
_ VI _ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
POLICE ORDERED X-RAY OF DEFENDANT, WHICH WAS 
OBTAINED WITHOUT HIS CONSENT OR A WARRANT, 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A FOURTH AMENDMENT 
VIOLATION; ALTERNATIVELY, EVEN IF THE 
WARRANTLESS X-RAY VIOLATED THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT, THE DIAMOND RING RECOVERED FROM 
DEFENDANT AFTER THE X-RAY HAD BEEN TAKEN WAS 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE "INEVITABLE DISCOVERY" 
RULE. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously 
denied his motion to suppress the x-ray of his body that was 
obtained by the pol ice withoi it h I s consent and without a warrant, 
and the ring that was revealed in the x-ray and subsequently 
seized by the police after the ring was naturally passed from his 
body ii i a bowel movement. claims that the x-ray should have 
been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of the 
principles set forth in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(1966), and that the ring also should have been suppressed as 
"fruit of the poisonous tree," see State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 
1216 (1 Jtah Ct. App. 1988) (discussing "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" doctrine). 
Under Schmerber, a warrantless intrusion into the body 
is justi fi ed i inder the fourth amendment if (1) reasonable methods 
are used, (2) there is probable cause that evidence will be 
found, and (3) there are exigent circumstances which make it 
impi act ic.aM v in oht d J i i a search warrant first. See 384 U.S. at 
770, 771-72; 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure S5.3(c), at 50 (2d eci, 
1987). The State has no quarrel with defendant that the taking 
of an x-iay In a typt.' of minor bodily intrusion which is subject 
to the proscriptions of Schmerber. See, e.g., United States v. 
Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982); People v. Williams, 157 
Ill.App.3d 996, 109 111.Dec. 577, 510 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1987); 
State v. Mabon, 648 S.W.2d 271, 275 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1982). Cf. 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (which dealt with the "more 
substantial intrusion" of surgery). 
At trial, defendant argued that the x-ray and the ring 
should be suppressed because the second and third prongs of the 
Schmerber test had not been satisfied (T. 63-66). On appeal, 
defendant expands his challenge to include the first prong of 
Schmerber, arguing that the manner in which the x-ray was 
obtained was not reasonable. Br. of Appellant at 23-26. Because 
this latter argument was not presented to the trial court in 
support of defendant's motion to suppress, it is not properly 
before this Court and should not be considered on appeal. 
Although some evidence was presented as to the possible dangers 
of x-rays, which the trial court did not find particularly 
helpful (T. 53-55), and substantial evidence was presented as to 
the struggle that occurred between the officers and defendant at 
the hospital during the x-ray examination, defense counsel merely 
stated with regard to the first prong of Schmerber: 
The first is the [means] used to 
effectuate the search must be reasonable. In 
Schmerber, there was a blood test, hospital 
conditions, that sort of thing. I would 
simply submit it on the evidence presented. 
(T. 63). This does not even approach the argument now presented 
on appeal. See State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) 
("[W]here a defendant fails to assert a particular ground for 
suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an 
appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal."). 
Accordingly, the State will limit its response to defendant's 
arguments regarding the second two prongs of Schmerber. 
A. Probable Cause 
The first question is whether the police had a "clear 
indication" that the ring was inside defendant's body. 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. As defendant correctly notes, the 
issue of whether this "clear indication" requirement is more 
demanding than the normal probable cause requirement is a matter 
of some uncertainty. See People v. Williams# 510 N.E.2d at 447. 
Although it can be argued that this requirement is somewhat more 
demanding than the usual probable cause requirement, see 2 
LaFave, Search and Seizure §5.3(c), at 502 (2d ed. 1987), it is 
most reasonably interpreted as requiring nothing more than that 
there be probable cause to search. Various courts have adopted 
such an interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 502 A.2d 489, 
492-93 (Me. 1985); People v. Sutherland, 683 P.2d 1192, 1196 
(Colo. 1984). This position finds clear support in United States 
v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), where the Supreme 
Court, in the context of deciding what level of suspicion would 
justify a seizure of an incoming traveler for purposes other than 
a border search, stated: 
The Court of Appeals held that the initial 
detention of respondent was permissible only 
if the inspectors possessed a "clear 
indication" of alimentary canal smuggling. 
The trial court concluded that "clear indication" means "there 
is a very high probability" (T. 78). 
This "clear indication" language comes from 
our opinion in Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 
(1966)# but we think the Court of Appeals 
misapprehended the significance of that 
phrase in the context in which it was used in 
Schmerber. The Court of Appeals viewed 
"clear indication" as an intermediate 
standard between "reasonable suspicion" and 
"probable cause." But we think that the 
words in Schmerber were used to indicate the 
need for particularized suspicion that the 
evidence sought might be found within the 
body of the individual, rather than as 
enunciating still a third Fourth Amendment 
threshold between "reasonable suspicion" and 
"probable cause." 
No other court, including this one, has 
ever adopted Schmerber's "clear indication" 
language as a Fourth Amendment standard. . . 
. We do not think that the Fourth Amendment's 
emphasis upon reasonableness is consistent 
with the creation of a third verbal standard 
in addition to "reasonable suspicion" and 
"probable cause"; we are dealing with a 
constitutional requirement of reasonableness, 
not mens rea, and subtle verbal gradations 
may obscure rather than elucidate the meaning 
of the provision in question. 
473 U.S. at 540-41 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
Using traditional "probable cause" as the touchstone, 
the question thus becomes whether the police had probable cause 
to believe that defendant had swallowed the ring and that it 
would be revealed by an x-ray. "In dealing with probable cause, 
. . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
men, not legal technicians, act." State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
542 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 388 
U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). 
_o_ 
The quantum of evidence needed for probable 
cause is significantly less than needed to 
prove guilt. Whether probable cause exists 
"depends upon an examination of all the 
information available to the searching 
officer in light of the circumstances as they 
existed at the time the search was made." 
The officer is also "entitled to assess the 
facts in light of [his or her] experience." 
State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231f 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(citations omitted; brackets in original). 
Applying the foregoing definition of probable cause, 
the police had probable cause to believe that defendant had 
swallowed the ring missing from the jewelry counter and that it 
would be revealed by an x-ray. The trial court made the 
following findings of fact, not challenged by defendant on 
appeal, which support that conclusion: 
We have testimony from Ms. Hurtado [a 
Sears security guard] as to her conversations 
with the salesman and as to her own 
observations, which she states that she 
conveyed to the police officers when they 
arrived at the scene. She testified 
basically that the salesman informed her that 
the young man that had just gone out the door 
had switched rings[.] . . . She looked out of 
the door and immediately saw a young man and 
saw no other young men in the area.... She 
kept her eye on him at all times until 
reinforcements arrived[,] and they confronted 
him, these being all people connected with 
security of the Sears store. 
This information was conveyed to the 
police officers by Ms. Hurtado and formed 
part of the bases upon [sic] their actions. 
They further talked to the salesman who 
informed them that the man had switched 
rings. Ms. Hurtado also informed the police 
that they had searched thoroughly the areas 
over which the defendant had travelled and 
had not found a ring[,] and the police made a 
second search with her and others from 
Sears[,] all searching for the ring. They 
searched garbage cans and every area that was 
available to them at the time. 
The police officer gave a Miranda Warning 
and arrested the defendant. And after such a 
warning, the defendant made the statement, "I 
might have had the ring and might have thrown 
it onto the roof." Upon that statement being 
made, the police had the roof searched and 
they could not find the ring. . . . 
The evidence would indicate that the 
police officers believed that under all of 
the circumstances that the defendant had 
swallowed the ring. They base this on the 
fact that he had been under constant survey 
[sic] from the time he left the jewelry 
section of Sears. That they made a thorough 
search of the area over which he had 
travelled, that they had searched him 
personally by strip searching his clothing, 
and they concluded that he had swallowed the 
ring[,] and based upon that they concluded 
they needed an x-ray. They needed to inspect 
the contents of his digestive system. 
(T. 75-77). The court then correctly concluded: 
Based upon all these facts, the Court, 
first of all, finds that the police had 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to 
believe the defendant had committed a crime 
and had reason to therefore arrest him. And 
furthermore, the Court finds that there was a 
very high probability, based upon the 
factsf,] that the defendant had in fact 
ingested the ring. 
(T. 77-78). 
The facts of this case are remarkably similar to those 
in People v. Williams, where the Illinois Court of Appeals 
concluded that there was probable cause to support an x-ray 
examination of the defendant, who the police suspected had 
ingested a diamond ring stolen shortly before from a jewelry 
store. There, two sheriff deputies stopped a vehicle reported to 
be involved in the theft of a jewelry store and arrested the 
occupants, one of whom was the defendant. 510 N.E.2d at 446. 
_i n_ 
After they had transported the defendant to the sheriff's office, 
the officers were informed that two rings had been taken in the 
jewelry theft, including a diamond ring. Ibid. 
[One of the officers then] noticed that the 
ring which he had observed on the little 
finger of defendant's right hand at the time 
of the arrest was no longer there. 
Furthermore, defendant told the officers that 
he knew nothing about the ring. In addition, 
the officers conducted a visual strip search 
of defendant and searched defendant's 
clothing, the squad car, the path leading 
from the squad car to the sheriff's office 
and the jail facility where the defendant was 
being held but could not find the ring. 
Id. at 448. On these facts, the Williams court concluded that 
the officers had probable cause to believe that the ring would be 
found in the defendant's body, thus providing a basis for 
subjecting the defendant to an x-ray examination, [^d. at 447-48. 
There is no reason to reach a different conclusion on the very 
similar facts presented in the instant case. 
B. Exigent Circumstances 
Whether there were exigent circumstances to justify a 
warrantless and nonconsensual x-ray examination of defendant 
presents a more difficult question. The trial court made the 
following findings on that issue: 
The testimony is, it would have taken a 
minimum of two hours to obtain a search 
warrant, either telephonically or otherwise. 
And that [the officers] felt the need to move 
ahead immediately because of the 
circumstances and because of the possibility 
that could exist that if, in fact, it was not 
in [defendant's] digestive system, this ring 
might be out there someplace on the parking 
lot and needed to be recovered immediately. 
The Court finds that there were exigent 
circumstances making it impracticable to 
obtain a search warrant because of . . . the 
value of the ring and the approaching 
darkness, and the fact that the parking lot 
was such a public area. 
The Court does rely upon the case of 
People vs. Williams, out of Illinois, and in 
that particular case the Illinois Court 
stated: "The deputies in the case at bar did 
not know whether the defendant had placed the 
ring in his mouth or whether he had discarded 
the ring in some other manner that an 
unauthorized person could obtain control of 
the ring. As a result, the deputies needed 
to know whether they needed to begin a 
detailed search of every place where the 
defendant had been since his arrest, 
including the thoroughfare where he was 
arrested. Stated differently, the deputies 
needed to act quickly in order to prevent the 
destruction or concealment of the ring." 
In this case the evidence is much more 
clear and I believe the evidence shows that . 
. . there was such a high probability that he 
had swallowed the ring because [the officers] 
had, in fact, made a thorough search of 
everywhere. No avenues seemed left where it 
could be. However, since that is a 
possibility that could exist, and because it 
was such a public place and because dark was 
approaching, that the circumstances were of 
such a nature as to require an immediate, 
final determination in this regard[,] and 
they were therefore justified in making this 
determination and not waiting for a search 
warrant, which would have put them by the 
time they obtained the warrant, then got 
through all the procedures for the x-rays, 
would have certainly put them into the total 
night hours[.] . . . 
(T. 78-79). 
This case admittedly requires an exigent circumstance 
analysis different from that traditionally engaged in by the 
courts. This is so because the exigent circumstances identified 
by the trial court involve the possible destruction or 
concealment of evidence not necessarily thought to be in the 
place to be searched — i.e., the interior of defendant's body. 
Put another way, the exigency involved the possible destruction 
or concealment of the ring at a location other than defendant's 
body if the officers did not quickly obtain an x-ray of defendant 
to determine whether the ring was inside of him; there was no 
perceived danger that the ring would be destroyed or concealed 
within defendant if an immediate x-ray examination of him were 
not performed. Cf:. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (exigent 
circumstance justified warrantless extraction of blood from 
defendant's bloodstream which the police reasonably believed 
contained alcohol); State v. Ashe# 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) 
(exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into and 
search of residence officers reasonably believed contained 
contraband). 
In determining that there were exigent circumstances to 
justify the warrantless, nonconsensual x-ray examination of 
defendant, the trial court relied heavily on the Williams 
decision, particularly the portion that it quoted regarding the 
officers' need to know whether the defendant had ingested the 
ring so that they could determine whether it was necessary "to 
begin a detailed search of every place [the] defendant had been 
since his arrest, including the public thoroughfare where he was 
arrested." In Williams, "the deputies needed to act quickly in 
order to prevent the destruction or concealment of the ring." 
510 N.E.2d at 448. The Illinois court specifically distinguished 
the case at bar from People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal.3d 394, 124 
Cal. Rptr. 528, 540 P.2d 624 (1975), a case cited by defendant in 
the instant case in support of his argument that exigent 
circumstances did not exist, where police officers, after 
observing the defendant place two balloons in her mouth and 
swallow them, required her to drink an emitic solution which 
caused her to regurgitate seven balloons containing heroin. The 
California Supreme Court held that the warrantless intrusion into 
the defendant's body constituted an unreasonable search because 
-there was no substantial reason to believe that evidence would 
be destroyed[,]" and it "appear[ed] that [the] defendant . . . 
easily could have been transported to jail and placed in an 
isolation cell and kept under proper surveillance.M 124 Cal. 
Rptr. at 535, 540 P.2d at 631. As the Williams court correctly 
noted, these circumstances were quite different from the 
situation before it, where the officers, although having probable 
cause to believe the defendant had swallowed the ring, were 
legitimately concerned that the ring might still be in a public 
area where it could easily be destroyed or concealed. 510 N.E.2d 
at 448. This latter circumstance required prompt action, and 
therefore the warrantless, nonconsensual x-ray examination of the 
defendant was justified. 
Although the question is admittedly a close one, in the 
instant case the trial court correctly applied the Williams 
analysis in concluding that there were exigent circumstances 
which justified the warrantless, nonconsensual x-ray examination 
of defendant. The State agrees with defendant that the value of 
the ring, which the court apparently relied upon to some extent, 
did not contribute to the exigencies of the situation. The 
impending darkness and the public nature of the area in which the 
ring might be more clearly constituted exigent circumstances, in 
that they related directly to the immediate threat of destruction 
or concealment of the ring. See Schmerbery 384 U.S. at 771 
(immediate threat of destruction of evidence constitutes exigent 
circumstance). Although this case does not present the usual 
exigent circumstance scenario, even defendant acknowledges that 
"the term exigent circumstances is incapable of precise 
definition." Br. of Appellant at 15 (quoting State v. Clark, 654 
P.2d 355, 360 (Ha. 1982)). With this in mind, the Williams case, 
while unique on its facts and holding concerning exigent 
circumstances, provides reasonable support for the lower court's 
ruling. 
C. "Inevitable Discovery" Rule 
If the Court determines that the warrantless x-ray 
examination of defendant was not lawful under Schmerber, the ring 
subsequently seized by the police after it had naturally passed 
from defendant's body was admissible under the "inevitable 
discovery" rule. 
In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court adopted the "inevitable discovery" rule as 
an exception to the exclusionary rule. As stated by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals: 
The "inevitable discovery" exception 
adopted by the Court in Nix . . . allows the 
introduction of illegally obtained evidence 
if the government can show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the tainted evidence 
would inevitably have been discovered through 
lawful means. This doctrine requires that 
"the fact or likelihood that makes the 
discovery inevitable arise from circumstances 
other than those disclosed by the illegal 
search itself." 
United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 
1989). The question presented in the instant case is whether the 
record demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
ring would inevitably have been discovered through lawful means 
by the police. As Professor LaFave correctly warns, "courts must 
be extremely careful not to apply the 'inevitable discovery' rule 
upon the basis of nothing more than a hunch or speculation as to 
what otherwise might have occurred. A 'majority of the courts 
that have utilized the exception have tended to define the 
necessary probability in terms of 'would,' and that requirement 
must be strictly adhered to." 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§11.4(a), at 383 (2d ed. 1987) (footnote omitted). 
After the police arrived at Sears, they gathered 
sufficient information to establish probable cause to arrest 
defendant for theft of the ring. As previously noted, they 
arrested defendant at the scene, before he was transported to the 
hospital for the x-ray examination. Defendant does not claim 
that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him before the 
x-ray was obtained. What he does argue is that, instead of 
subjecting him to an x-ray examination, the police simply should 
have done that which they did anyway to recover the ring — i.e., 
place him in an isolation cell and wait for him to pass the ring 
through a bowel movement. Br. of Appellant at 22-23. Having 
placed defendant under arrest at the scene and made a 
contemporaneous inquiry to the jail to determine whether an 
isolation cell (i.e., one where defendant's feces could be 
recovered and he could be kept under surveillance (T. 33)) was 
available for defendant, the police, once they suspected that 
defendant had swallowed the ring, clearly intended to place 
defendant in an isolation cell at some point in an effort to 
recover the ring. Obviously, this would have been done even 
without the x-ray. The record demonstrates this by at least a 
preponderance of the evidence. Defendant effectively concedes 
this point. See Br. of Appellant at 22-23 ("In the present case, 
officers could have placed Mr. Palmer in isolation and under 
observation during the time it would have taken to get a search 
warrant. . . . Furthermore, the ring would have passed through 
his system in a short period of time. Mr. Palmer was ultimately 
placed in isolation and the ring passed through his system (T. 
61-2). This could have been done without obtaining an x-ray."). 
Thus, even if it is assumed that the x-ray examination 
violated Schmerber and the x-ray therefore was inadmissible, the 
ultimate seizure of the ring (which, unlike the x-ray, is the 
critical evidence in the case) resulted from an entirely lawful 
procedure which the police would have naturally followed in such 
circumstances and which defendant sanctions in his brief. 
Accordingly, the ring was admissible under the "inevitable 
discovery" rule adopted in Nix. See United States v. Andrade, 
784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986) (even if search of 
defendant's garment bag not lawful search incident to arrest an 
hour earlier, evidence admissible under "inevitable discovery" 
rule, as "it is normal DEA procedure to inventory defendant's 
possessions, including a garment bag, at the time of booking"); 
State v. Vinclk, 436 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Iowa 1989) (though gun on 
bed under sheet obtained in illegal warrantless search at 
homicide scene, inevitable discovery rule applicable, as gun was 
certain to be discovered upon later removal of body). Cf. United 
States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 695-96 (2nd Cir. 1988) (immediate 
warrantless search of bag arrested defendant had been carrying 
was illegal due to lack of exigent circumstances; evidence not 
admissible on ground it would inevitably have been discovered in 
later inventory, as "the record reveals no evidence that such 
searches were an invariable, routine proceeding in the booking 
and detention of a suspect at the particular FBI office 
involved"). Even though the trial court did not rely on the 
inevitable discovery rule in denying defendant's motion to 
suppress, this Court "may affirm the trial court's ruling on any 
proper grounds." State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985). 
See also State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 405 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Vincik, 436 N.W.2d at 354 ("It does not matter that the district 
court did not rely on [the inevitable discovery rule] when 
admitting the gun and the t-shirt, for its ruling will be upheld 
if sustainable on any grounds appearing in the record."). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
(in its entirety or, at the very least, insofar as the ring was 
_1 Q-
ruled admissible). His conviction should therefore also be 
affirmed. LL~~— 
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ADDENDUM 
that before you make an intrusion into someone's body, 
you have judicial review to determine whether or not it 
is appropriate. That hasn't been done and because of 
that all of the evidence should be suppressed. 
THE COURT: We will be in recess until 1:30. 
am going to take that time to review these Law Review 
Articles and review these facts and render a decision at 
that time. 
MR. BRADSHAW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(At noon Court recessed until 1:30 p.m.) 
THE COURT: Let the record show we are back in 
session in State of Utah vs. Palmer. The defendant is 
present with counsel and the State is represented by its 
counsel. I have reviewed carefully the facts, the 
evidence that has been received during this hearing, and 
I have also reviewed the case submitted by the State at 
the beginning of this hearing upon which they rely: 
People vs. Williams, 510 NE 2d 445. The case out of 
Illinois, 1987 case. And I have also reviewed the Law 
Review Article and the other article presented by the 
defense dealing with the question of post arrest --
dealing with the question of inspections of and 
intrusions into the body. And I am now ready to make a 
ruling on the defense's Motion for Suppression. 
The facts in this particular case have to be 
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analyzed from the point of view of the police officers in 
determining whether or not they had probable cause for 
arrest, and whether or not they had Justifiable reason 
under the law for a search by way of x-ray and whether or 
not they used reasonable methods. And this depends upon 
the evidence that is received, and again the standard is 
not a subjective standard. It is an objective standard 
of what a reasonable police officer would do under the 
same circumstances, with the same facts in mind, had he 
been on the scene at that time. 
We have testimony from Ms. Hurtado as to her 
conversations with the salesman and as to her own 
observations, which she states that she conveyed to the 
police officers when they arrived at the scene. She 
testified basically that the salesman informed her that 
the young man that had just gone out the door had 
switched rings, and she testified that she ran to the 
door and looked out. I don't remember "ran to the door." 
She looked out of the door and immediately saw a young 
man and saw no other young men in the area. And I think 
she said no other men in the area and she kept her eye on 
him at all times until reinforcements arrived and they 
confronted him, these being all people connected with 
security of the Sears store. 
This information was conveyed to the police 
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officers by Ms. Hurtado and formed part of the bases upon 
their actions. They further talked to the salesman who 
informed them that the man had switched rings. 
Ms. Hurtado also informed the police that they had 
searched thoroughly the areas over which the defendant 
had travelled and had not found a ring and the police 
made a second search with her and others from Sears all 
searching for the ring. They searched garbage cans and 
every area that was available to them at that time. 
The police officer gave a Miranda Warning and 
arrested the defendant. And after such a warning, the 
defendant made the statement, "I might have had the ring 
and I might have thrown it onto the roof." Upon that 
statement being made, the police had the roof searched 
and they could not find the ring. The evidence indicates 
the ring was of great value, being a diamond ring. The 
facts indicate that it was getting dark, that the police 
did search the defendant, a strip search, as well as his 
clothing and there was some concern and fear that with 
dark approaching, if in fact the defendant had disposed 
of the ring under a car or flipped it someplace, that 
someone may have picked it up and because of this they 
felt some urgency in determining once — well, in 
determining with certainty that the ring was not on the 
person of the defendant. 
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The evidence would indicate that the police 
officers believed that under all of the circumstances 
that the defendant had swallowed the ring. They base 
this on the fact that he had been under constant survey 
from the time he left the jewelry section of Sears. That 
they had made a thorough search of the area over which he 
had travelled, that they had searched him personally by 
strip searching his clothing, and they concluded that he 
had swallowed the ring and based upon that they concluded 
they needed an x-ray. They needed to inspect the 
contents of his digestive system. 
The testimony is, it would have taken a minimum 
of two hours to obtain a search warrant, either 
telephonically or otherwise. And that they felt the need 
to move ahead immediately because of the circumstances 
and because of the possibility that could exist that if, 
in fact, it was not in his digestive system, this ring 
might be out there someplace on the parking lot and 
needed to be recovered immediately. 
Based upon all of these facts, the Court, first 
of all, finds that the police had probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant had 
committed a crime and had reason to therefore arrest him. 
And further more, the Court finde that there was a very 
high probability, based upon the facts that the defendant 
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1 had in fact ingested the ring. 
2 I Some of the cases talk about clear indication. 
3 J There has to be a clear indication. The cases also say 
4 J that there is not a clear definition of what that means, 
5 J but it means more than probable cause. It means less 
6 I than absolute certainty and the best evidence that I read 
7 was that what clear indication means is that there is a 
8 very high probability. And based upon the evidence and 
9 I facts that this Court has heard, that the information 
10 available to the police at that time would indicate a 
11 I very high probability that the defendant had, in fact, 
12 swallowed this ring because they had excluded by thorough 
13 search other possibilities. 
14 The Court finds that there were exigent 
15 circumstances making it impracticable to obtain a search 
16 warrant because of the fact that immediate information 
17 had concerning the ring was with certainty had to be made 
18 I because of the value of the ring and the approaching 
19 J darkness, and the fact that the parking lot was such a 
20 I public area. 
21 I The Court does rely upon the case of People vs. 
22 J Williams, out of Illinois, and in that particular case 
23 I the Illinois Court stated: "The deputies in the case at 
24 bar did not know whether the defendant had placed the 
25 I ring in his mouth or whether he had discarded the ring in 
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Borne other manner that an unauthorized pwreon eouiw 
obtain control of the ring. As a result, the deputies 
needed to know whether the defendant had ingested the 
ring or whether they needed to begin a detailed search of 
everyplace where the defendant had been since his arrest, 
including the thoroughfare where he was arrested. Stated 
differently, the deputies needed to act quickly in order-
to prevent the destruction or concealment of the ring." 
In this case the evidence is much more clear 
and I believe the evidence shows that the police 
officers — that there was such a high probability that 
he had swallowed the ring because they had, in fact, made 
a thorough search of everywhere. No avenues seemed left 
where it would be. However, since that is a possibility 
that could exist, and because it was such a public place 
and because dark was approaching, that the circumstances 
were of such a nature as to require an immediate, final 
determination in this regard and they were therefore 
justified in making this determination and not waiting 
for a search warrant, which would have put them by the 
time they obtained the warrant, then got through all of 
the procedures for the x-rays, would have certainly put 
them into the total night hours, which brings us really 
to the third leg of whether or not there was reasonable 
means that were chosen to detect this ring with 
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1 I certainty. 
2 Actually, there would have been four things the 
3 officers could have done. They could have induced 
4 I vomiting. But then, the question of whether it is still 
5 I in the stomach or travelled through into the digestive 
6 tract beyond. And the question would have been the very 
7 I inducement of the vomiting itself, bringing a ring back 
8 up through the esophagus, whether there would have been 
9 choking. That is one alternative. And if that had been 
10 done, the same issues would have been here, except as to 
11 whether or not that is a method that should have been 
12 I chosen. The second alternative would have been to cut 
13 him open by surgery. The third would have been by x-ray, 
14 and the fourth one would have been to wait for the ring 
15 J to pass. The officers waited for the ring to pass, the 
16 J same issue of urgency was facing them and that was not an 
17 J alternative at this point under these circumstances. 
18 Certainly, the least intrusive of all of the 
19 J methods chosen would have been an x-ray. We all know 
20 I about x-rays, and we all receive them annually for our 
21 J physicals. Everyone does and it certainly was the least 
22 intrusive of all of the methods chosen to make this 
23 I determination. 
24 It is therefore the conclusion of this Court 
25 J that this warrant was searched by x-ray. It was 
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1 J justified under the totality of the circumstances, along 
2 I with the reasonable inferences of those circumstances in 
3 J this particular case. And defendant's Motion to Suppress 
4 I the said x-ray evidence or evidence to follow the taking 
5 I of the x-ray is denied. 
6 Now, the Court has made its ruling. We are 
7 I scheduled to commence trial tomorrow morning at 10:00. 
8 MR. BRADSHAW: Your Honor, would it be possible 
9 I for me to have five or ten minutes with my client? 
10 THE COURT: Certainly. Take what time you need 
11 I and we will just be in informal recess while you confer 
12 I with your client. 
13 I (A short recess was taken.) 
14 THE COURT: Let the record show we are back in 
15 I session and now we are in a Pretrial Conference. The 
16 J matter being scheduled for trial tomorrow in case of 
17 State of Utah vs. Ricky Palmer 89-0718, to be followed 
18 immediately by State of Utah vs. Ricky Palmer 89-0719, 
19 and the defendant is present. Mr. Bradshaw. 
20 MR. BRADSHAW: Your Honor, in speaking with 
21 J Mr. Bown and speaking with Mr. Palmer, it appears we have 
22 a resolution of this case. That would be as follows: 
23 I Mr. Palmer would plead guilty as charged in the case that 
24 we had before the Court today: 89-1900718. It would be 
25 I a conditional plea pursuant to State vs. Sire. That is, 
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